This article is part of our The Z Files series.
I'll make you a promise. Once MLB announces the 2020 schedule, I'll be on the forefront of next-level analysis, offering insights others will overlook. Until then, I'm going to refrain from discussing which players may benefit or be hurt by the delay. Until the particulars are known, it's all speculation.
On the other hand, there are some obvious alterations to the usual plan that will be the consequence of whatever MLB decides to do, and no one is more equipped to review the effect on conventional valuation as yours truly. Not to mention, valuation and its inherent flaws have been the theme of the spring installments of this column, so this is a natural extension.
It's apparent the 2020 schedule will be both condensed and extended and likely shorter. That is, off days could be lost along with the inclusion of doubleheaders, making Ernie Banks smile. In addition, games are likely to extend past October, perhaps contested in neutral warm weather sites and domes. For the record, this isn't parroting a certain player agent's suggestion; it's been bandied about in a more league-wide sense.
Again, not focusing on specific players, there's a few global repercussions with respect to logical playing time expectations. Using 144 games as an arbitrary example and by no means a prediction, players accustomed to missing just a handful of games will probably be idle for a few more. Scaling down 156 games played in a normal season equates to 139 in a 144-game campaign. However, with
I'll make you a promise. Once MLB announces the 2020 schedule, I'll be on the forefront of next-level analysis, offering insights others will overlook. Until then, I'm going to refrain from discussing which players may benefit or be hurt by the delay. Until the particulars are known, it's all speculation.
On the other hand, there are some obvious alterations to the usual plan that will be the consequence of whatever MLB decides to do, and no one is more equipped to review the effect on conventional valuation as yours truly. Not to mention, valuation and its inherent flaws have been the theme of the spring installments of this column, so this is a natural extension.
It's apparent the 2020 schedule will be both condensed and extended and likely shorter. That is, off days could be lost along with the inclusion of doubleheaders, making Ernie Banks smile. In addition, games are likely to extend past October, perhaps contested in neutral warm weather sites and domes. For the record, this isn't parroting a certain player agent's suggestion; it's been bandied about in a more league-wide sense.
Again, not focusing on specific players, there's a few global repercussions with respect to logical playing time expectations. Using 144 games as an arbitrary example and by no means a prediction, players accustomed to missing just a handful of games will probably be idle for a few more. Scaling down 156 games played in a normal season equates to 139 in a 144-game campaign. However, with fewer off days and added twin bills, position players are likely to max out at 130-135 games in this scenario. Workhorse starting pitchers earmarked for 32 starts would be proportionately reduced to 28. However, unless things laid out perfectly, it's hard to envision even the likes of Jacob deGrom or Gerrit Cole taking the hill more than 26 times. Again, this is hypothetical, using the example to demonstrate playing time isn't likely to be scaled proportionately.
Playing time is a zero-sum economy. As such, lost at-bats and innings must be picked up elsewhere. Without knowing the roster size of a specific league and how it can be deployed, the exact redistribution is unclear. That said, replacement level will likely increase for most leagues. This has measurable valuation consequences that transcend, "John Doe will benefit from the 2020 schedule."
Before shining light on said consequences, let's review the principle of replacement theory and how it applies to valuation. Value (or potential, for those long-time readers) is only assigned to useful stats. If everyone has something, it's not worth anything. The replacement player in a rotisserie sense is mythical, since value is a sum of multiple categories. That said, it can be estimated using the average stats of a few of the worst players at each position in the draft-worthy pool along with those who just miss the cut. This way, a player with 10 homers and one steal doesn't set the level, he's averaged with another blasting just one home run while swiping seven bags, along with a handful of others.
For the record, the current hitting inventory of most leagues requires just two pools, hence two replacement levels: catcher and non-catcher.
The associated replacement level is subtracted from the raw stats of all the players in the respective pools. The manner to determine the draft-worthy pool is an iterative process and beyond the scope of this discussion, but using the percentage value method (PVM), each player is assigned value proportional to their useful contribution of the aggregate useful stats per category.
Let's circle back to the notion the probable 2020 campaign will result in top-end players with proportionately lower numbers while the replacement will be higher than normal, on a relative basis. The result will be a flattening of projected earnings. The lowest ranked players will still be priced at $1, but since the top end will contribute a lower share of the useful stat pool, their potential earning will be lower than when computed in a normal season. While this leans strongly towards a balanced approach to allotting your budget in leagues that have postponed their auctions, I'll save the nuts and bolts to fulfill my introductory promise, leading the way with top-shelf analysis when we know what we're working with.
Instead, let's take advantage of this opportunity to illustrate a little about how the sausage is made, using a 15-team mixed, 5x5 rotisserie league as the model. I ran my hitter projections using the normal 162-game season, the 144-game version discussed herein while also further reducing it to 120 contests. The following is the cumulative projected earnings for the first 50 hitters:
Games | Earnings | Average |
162 | $1,299 | $25.98 |
144 | $1,256 | $25.12 |
120 | $1,189 | $23.78 |
Like playing time, valuation is a zero-sum scenario. The earnings lost up top must be made up elsewhere. Let's look at the bottom 50 players.
Games | Earnings | Average |
162 | $149 | $2.98 |
144 | $156 | $3.12 |
120 | $164 | $3.28 |
It's not much, but the lower tier batters are collectively worth a little more. The rest is obviously distributed among the remaining 110 hitters.
Given that the focus of much of the spring in this space was devoted to debunking the notion of overpaying, at least on paper, spending $50 on the top batter in a 162-game season yields a potential greater return on investment (or less of a loss) than the same amount in a truncated campaign.
The pitching dynamic is different since adding more innings to the replacement level could be detrimental, with two ratio categories worsening the value. There's a strong chance the composition of the draft-worthy pool changes once the schedule is official. That is, dominant middle relievers with strong ratios just out of the initial draft-worthy pool will displace back-end starters with lousy ratios, changing the makeup of the pool with regard to wins and strikeouts. Again, saving the hardcore analysis for when we know what's happening, the top-tier starters, especially on competitive teams, are likely to retain their current value even with a higher replacement level, since they'll be even further striated from the next tier.
Hang in there, friends, we'll all get through this together, and I pledge to prepare you for whatever eventuality transpires over the coming weeks and months.
